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DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF CALIFORNIA UNIONS:
A STUDY IN POLICY CHANGES
By EPHAuI B. MARGOLIN*
The development of California Labor Law discloses at once a careful
elaboration of the institutional status of the union, consisting of a net of
obligations of the union to its membership, and a current contraction of the
right of the union to engage in the basic activities of organization and strik-
ing. While the California Supreme Court has defined a democratic mechan-
ism for the unions it has also jeopardized their effectiveness in collective
bargaining by restricting the right to strike which is a necessary and prime
condition to that function.
This paper will endeavor to outline briefly, first, the decisions which
structure the union as a democratic institution. Next, the Court's decisions,
culminating in Garmon' and Chavez,2 which curtail the power of the union
to organize workers and its decisions interpreting the Jurisdictional Strike
Act3 which limit the union's power to strike for hours, wages and conditions
will be discussed. Finally, it will be submitted that a collective bargaining
agency which cannot safely organize workers in a non-union industry nor
engage in a strike for wages, hours and conditions can not fully perform
the activity for which it was designed.
The analysis of this problem will be developed through California cases
omitting the decisions dealing with federal preemption, which is to be
regarded as a separate subject. The following applies only to California
intra-state labor relations.
I
The history of the California Supreme Court decisions structuring the
union as an institution is an impressive one.
From the days of King v. Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge4 in the
England of 1721 until Parkinson v. Building Trades Council,5 the 1908
*Eq. A.B., Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1949; LL.B., Yale University Law School,
1952; Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1953. Member of the Israel Bar. Lecturer
in law at San Francisco Law School.
The author wishes to express his deep appreciation to the Honorable Mathew 0. Tobriner,
Justice of the California District Court of Appeal, First District, Division One, who, before his
appointment to the bench, discussed this article with the author, and without whose inspiration
it would not have been written.
1 Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
2 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d ....... 339 P.2d 801 (1959).
3 CAL. LAB. CoDE §§ 1115-1120.
4 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (K.B. 1721).
5 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908).
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California leading case, the unions fought an uphill fight for recognition.6
Combinations of working men devoted to the ends of promoting better
labor conditions, analogized to bands of merchants intent on price fixing or
malefactors attempting a crime, were treated as criminal conspiracies.' The
courts regarded concerted interferences in another's business as prima facie
unlawful. The fact of such interference, rather than its motivation, consti-
tuted the actionable evil.'
The landmark Parkinson case refined the application of the conspiracy
doctrine to labor activity. While reasserting that "Any injury to a lawful
business is ... prima facie actionable,"9 the court proceeded to formulate
an exception. The case developed the test of the lawfulness of the objective
of the union. The action might be upheld "upon the ground that it was
merely the result of lawful efforts of the defendants to promote their own
welfare."10
During the subsequent half century the California Supreme Court
proceeded by means of this test to hold certain actions of the union unlaw-
ful.' In this manner the court set up a series of requirements as to the
union's composition (i.e. its membership), the union's internal government
and the local union's relationship with its parent body; obligations which,
in toto, went far toward composing the legal requisites of a democratic
union.
Thus in James v. Marinship Corp. 2 the court held that a union which
had a closed shop contract or which monopolistically controlled the oppor-
6 In People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1835) the court held it criminal for laborers
to combine to raise their wages. The decision was distinguished with disapproval in Comm. v.
Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842) and criticized in Sayre v. Louisville Union Benevolent
Ass'n, 62 Ky. 143 (1863). Sources are collected in Sultan, Historical Antecedents to the Right
to Work Controversy, 31 So. CALIF. L. REv. 221 (1958). In California, Parkinson v. Building
Trades Council, supra note 5, held that in the absence of a statute to the contrary, a union is not
liable for damages resulting from its economic pressure activities unless either the activity itself
or the objective sought is unlawful. Since then unions have seldom been called conspiracies, but
see Euclid Candy Co. v. Longshoremen, 49 Cal. App. 2d 137, 121 P.2d 91 (1942). See also cases
cited supra notes 1 and 2 which seem to imply that the clock is turning backwards.
7 See McKay v. Retail Auto S. L. Union, 16 Cal. 2d 311, 106 P.2d 373 (1940), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 566 (1940) ; Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324 (1909).
8 Parkinson v. Building Trades Council, 154 Cal. 581, 98 Pac. 1027 (1908) ; 30 Cal. Jur. 2d
Labor 80 (1956).
9 154 Cal. at 603, 98 Pac. at 1036.
10 Id. at 604, 98 Pac. at 1036. Where a rule was adopted before a particular dispute, it was
clearly adopted for the benefit of those who adopted it and not intended to infringe on other's
interests. Id. at 599, 98 Pac. at 1034. Contrast with the cases cited in the last part of this article.
11 For efforts to categorize the confusion, see Tobriner, The Organizational Picket Line,
3 STAN. L. Rav. 423 (1951) ; Tobriner, A New Concept of Labor Law, 27 CAL. S.B.J. 414 (1952) ;
Tobriner, The Labor Union, Public Utility of Labor Relations, 43 A.B.A.J. 805 (1957). See
also A.C.L.U., Democracy in Labor Unions, Sept. 1958 Report, cited in Chavez v. Sargent,
52 Cal. 2d ......... 339 P.2d 801, 821 (1959).
12 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
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tunity for employment could not arbitrarily refuse membership to qualified
applicants. In Williams v. Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers" the court
defined the concept of monopoly as applicable to control of the labor supply
of a single plant. In Hughes v. Superior Court,4 holding that limitations on
membership must relate to individual qualifications for the job rather than
to arbitrary discrimination based on race or color, the court enjoined the
union from picketing for that unlawful objective. On the other hand, the
court in Dotson v. Int'l Alliance of T.S. Employees 5 upheld the require-
ment that the individual workman meet reasonable standards for mem-
bership 6 including the ability to perform the job." Even though Marinship
stated that the union need not accept persons "having interests inimical to
the union and who may destroy it from within,"' 8 a mere conflict of
interests as between an independent distributor, 9 a foreman, 2 a business-
13 27 Cal. 2d 586, 591, 165 P.2d 903, 906 (1946).
14 32 Cal. 2d 850, 856, 198 P.2d 885, 889 (1948). But for current problems of discrimination
against foreign (Mexican) labor, see The San Francisco Examiner, July 22, 1959.
15 34 Cal. 2d 362, 210 P.2d 5 (1949). The court held that failure to allege that such require-
ments were met constitutes a failure to state a cause of action.
16 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); DeMille v. Am. Fed. of
Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
17 See Zepeda v. International Hodcarrier's Union, 143 Cal.App.2d 609, 300 P.2d 251
(1956) (dictum). Plaintiff was 73 years old, allegedly an epileptic, unable to perform heavy
work and otherwise not a "qualified, competent and skilled worker." He was permitted by the
union to seek employment on his own, but since the union maintained a hiring hall, the gesture
amounted to practical denial of the right to work. The court decided the case on other grounds
stating that the union has duties towards the employer which may require it to discriminate
against the plaintiff.
18 James v. Marinship Corp., supra note 16.
19 Of the two cases dealing with the subject, only one, Erode v. San Joaquin County
Central Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943), mentions the problem. "The par-
ticular controversy between the dairy and the union ... involving as it does the dissatisfaction
of organized labor with a system of distributing milk products which avoids minimum wages
and hours, workmen's compensation and social security benefits, is a legitimate matter of labor
dispute." The other case, Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944), distinguishes
the Rimde case on the grounds that the independents in Bautista were bona fide businessmen
which, however true, still leaves the problem unsolved. The economic background of the case
is stated only in the dissent. "... [Tlhe plaintiffs here, by insisting upon continuing their ac-
tivities as peddlers, were actually competing with union workers on unequal terms and under
conditions which the union, not unjustifiably considered to be obnoxious to its legitimate ob-
jects." The majority avoids deciding which interest should be granted preference granting the
plaintiffs their wish by default. The court also assumes that plaintiffs are a minority which, like
any other minority, should be granted protection since their activities "are not fundamentally
inimical to the public interest or to the special interest of organized labor !" The Bautista case
leaves the union with the alternative of admitting competitors into its rank (said competitors not
being under obligation to conform with union practices) or acquiescing in their competition.
The decision contains the statement that "Milk is only one commodity distributed by retail
delivery, and not all businessmen-workers are engaged in retail distribution of commodities.
The Union's position would have an identical effect on the laundry and dry cleaning driver, the
barber and the plumber, the watchmaker and the groceryman, the service station operator, and
the farmer. In a word, all businessmen workers operating without the aid of employees .... .
20 The California Supreme Court has held that managers of stores owe their undivided
loyalty to their principal and should not be compelled to hold membership in a union repre-
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man-employee21 or a temporary worker' and the union representing the
rank and file will not excuse exclusion from membership.
Similar conclusions must be drawn from the examination of cases
dealing with the internal government of the unions.2 3 The union may not
expel or suspend its members in violation of its own rules, 3 on an improper
majority vote25 or by an improperly constituted tribunal.26 It must afford
senting the grocery clerks. Safeway v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 41 Cal. 2d 567, 261 P.2d 721
(1953). Superintendents were considered "employees" in Davis v. Morris, 37 Cal. App. 2d 269,
99 P.2d 345 (1940). See also cases collected in Safeway v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, supra at 580.
21 In discussing the right of a union to assert its pressure against independent working
entrepreneurs operating in the same fields and competing with the union, the organizational
drive was held a lawful objective provided only that full and equal membership in the union
is guaranteed to the independents. Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers, 109 Cal. App. 2d 123, 240
P.2d 361 (1952) ; Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers, 88 Cal. App. 2d 499, 199 P.2d 400 (1948).
Compare Rubin v. American Sportsmen, etc., Soc., 40 Cal. 2d 412, 254 P.2d 510 (1953).
22 Thorman v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494
(1958).
23 Union constitutions and by-laws are "a contract" between the union and its members,
Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897), binding on the employee as long as his
union follows its own rules. Carson v. Glass Bottle Blower's Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6
(1951) ; DeMille v. Am. Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947) ; Smith v.
Kern County Med. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 263, 120 P.2d 874 (1942); DeGonia v. Building Material
and Dump Truck Drivers, 155 Cal. App. 2d 573, 318 P.2d 486 (1957); Smetherman v. Laundry
Workers Union, 44 Cal. App. 2d 131, 111 P.2d 948 (1941). The union's interpretation of its own
rules must be "practical and reasonable." DeMille v. Am. Fed. of Radio Artists, supra at 147,
187 P.2d at 775. Words must be construed not in their abstract meaning with the aid of a dic-
tionary, but in the context of the constitution as a whole, Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal. App. 2d 781,
785, 180 P.2d 982, 985 (1947), i.e., "with a view to accomplishing the objectives disclosed by
the instrument as a whole." DeMonbrum v. Metal Sheet Workers, 140 Cal. App. 2d 546, 558,
295 P.2d 881, 891 (1956). Unlawful imposition of a new union constitution in substitution for
a previous lawful one was enjoined in Weber v. Marine Cooks and Stewards Union, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 327, 208 P.2d 1009 (1949), the court allowing attorney's fees to class plaintiffs who
instituted suit for protection of the common fund and the original constitution. In Gonzales
v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 216, 298 P.2d 92, 98 (1956), the president's
power to mete out a new penalty in lieu of the penalty determined by the lodge was curbed,
the court stating that "A clearly erroneous administrative construction of a definite and un-
ambiguous provision of the constitution cannot operate to change its meaning." See also cases
cited.
24 The grave effects of expulsion or suspension (discussed in Gonzales, supra note 23) im-
pose certain duties on the disciplining union. "No member can be expelled and thus deprived
of his interest in the property of the association, except for violation of some provision of the
law of the association creating the offense charged and prescribing expulsion as a penalty or,
in the absence of such provision, for offenses of an infamous character indictable in Common
Law, or for offenses against the member's duty to the organization." Smetherham v. Laundry
Workers Union, supra note 23, at 137, 111 P.2d at 951. See also Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers
Ass'n, supra note 23. Expulsion or other sanctions are upheld "for such conduct as clearly vio-
lates the fundamental objects of the association, and if persisted in and allowed would thwart
those objects or bring the association into disrepute." Otto v. Tailors P & B Union, 75 Cal. 308,
314, 17 Pac. 217, 219 (1888).
25 Gonzales v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 23, at 216, 298 P.2d at 98. The consti-
tution of the union was violated by substitution of a standing vote for the secret vote required
and the vote of 29 out of 44 voting in expulsion proceedings was held not to satisfy the require-
ment of a two-thirds majority.
2 6 Harris v. Marine Cooks & Stewards, 116 Cal. App. 2d 759, 254 P.2d 673 (1953). Failure
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the defendant a fair trial' including notice,'8 hearing,' the right to con-
front witnesses and accusers,30 the right to cross-examine them and the
opportunity to refute their evidence.31 These requirements of due process in
union trials will be judicially imposed even if the union rules fail to provide
for them.32 The insistence of the courts upon the applicability of due
process reflects the philosophy that the union must be treated less as an
autonomous private body than an organization subject to regulation
analagous to that of a public utility."
The courts have similarly imposed rules as to exhaustion of remedies
entirely independent of those agreed upon by the members themselves.34
While ordinarily the courts will decline jurisdiction when internal remedies
are still available to the petitioner, 5 no exhaustion of remedies is necessary
to object, discussed in Hopson v. Marine Cooks & Stewards, 116 Cal. App. 2d 320, 253 P.2d 733
(1953) but held harmless where there is no question that a violation of a union rule has occurred.
DeMille v. Am. Fed. of Radio Artists, supra note 23 (upholding automatic suspension for non-
payment of dues or assessments). Where plaintiff denies most, if not all, of the charges against
him, automatic suspension will violate due process. Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n,
37 Cal.2d 134, 145, 231 P.2d 6, 12 (1951).
27 Cases cited notes 26 to 32
28 Gonzales v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, supra note 23; DeMille v. Am. Fed. of Radio
Artists, supra note 23; Harris v. Marine Cooks & Stewards, supra note 26.
29 Ibid. Where the union acted after a hearing, the courts tend not to evaluate the evidence
upon which the action was taken, e.g., McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 106 Cal. App. 696,
289 Pac. 852 (1930), but it is otherwise where no evidence was presented. An order of reinstate-
ment to membership due to faulty hearing was too broad and was amended to remand to the
union for rehearing since such a penalty may be justified if insubordination is proved. Cason
v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, supra note 26 at 147, 231 P.2d at 13.
3 0 Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, supra note 26.
31 Ibid.
32Holderby v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 45 Cal. 2d 843, 291 P.2d 463 (1955)
(dictum); Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, supra note 26; Gonzales v. Int'l Ass'n of Ma-
chinists, supra note 23. For a discussion of waiver see Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n,
supra; McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers, supra note 29; Killeen v. Hotel & R. Emp., etc.,
League, 84 Cal. App. 2d 87, 190 P.2d 30 (1948) ; Bush v. Int'l Alliance of T. S. Employees,
55 Cal. App. 2d 357, 120 P.2d 788 (1942); Smetherham v. Laundry Workers Union, supra
note 23.
33 Attention should be directed to the apparent inconsistency in the treatment of the prob-
lems of admission in and exclusion from the union. While the first problem is considered by the
courts in conjunction with the closed shop and, consequently, in terms of labor monopoly or
"quasi governmental" stature, the second problem frequently is equated with "unincorporated
associations," citing cases and precedents relating to fraternal orders, lodges, professional asso-
ciations, etc. The tendency to equate labor unions with such associations is obvious, also, in
cases dealing with relations between a local and the international. The courts never determined
where one analogy begins and the other one ends.
34 Holderby v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra note 32; Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal.
613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897) ; Levy v. Magnolia Lodge, 110 Cal. 297, 42 Pac. 887 (1895) ; Otto v.
Tailors P & B Union, 75 Cal. 308, 17 Pac. 217 (1888) ; Zepeda v. Int'l Hodcarriers, etc., 143 Cal.
App. 2d 609, 300 P.2d 251 (1956) ; McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers, supra note 29; Stoica
v. Int'l Alliance of T. S. Employees, 78 Cal. App. 2d 533, 178 P.2d 21 (1947). The complaint
must so allege. Bush v. Int'l Alliance of T. S. Employees, supra note 32.
35 
"This rule is analogous to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies
as a condition precedent to resorting to the courts (see 2 Cm. Jun. 2d 304) and to the rule
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where appellate review is denied improperly,36 conditioned on unauthorized
requests, 37 unable to assure substantial justice,38 futile39 or rendered im-
practical by the behavior of union officers themselves.4" Furthermore, in
requiring the parties to a contract for arbitration of disputes to exhaust these remedies before
seeking judicial relief (see Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 2d 558, 277 P.2d 464 (1954)
and cases collected on p. 563) ." Holderby v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra note 32 at
846, 291 P.2d at 466; DeGonia v. Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, 155 Cal. App. 2d
573, 318 P.2d 486 (1957).
36 In cases where the union is compared to an unincorporated association, its conclusive
ruling will be binding on the court if (1) authorized by the constitution; (2) rendered in good
faith; (3) no illegalities are involved. McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers, 106 Cal. 696, 289
Pac. 852 (1930) citing Otto v. Tailors P & B Union, supra note 34. "If the decision arrived at
was contrary to natural justice, such as ... not having an opportunity to explain misconduct,
if the rules of the club have not been observed, and if the action of the club was malicious and
not bona fide .. . " McConville v. Milk Wagon Drivers, supra; Lawson v. Hewell, supra note
34; Zepeda v. Int'l Hodcarriers, etc., supra note 34. "When a voluntary association has violated
its own laws and has arbitrarily violated a member's property right, the rule of exhaustion of
remedies in administrative tribunals has not always been resorted to before a direct resort to
the court, but (the field of court interference should be a very narrow one) 'so that only upon
the clearest kind of showing, either that the constitution and rules are violated by the decision
of the tribunals set up by them, or that the remedies provided by the parties in their agree-
ments for appeal . . .are nonexistent or unreasonable . . . .' Local 7, Bricklayers Union v.
Bowen, 278 Fed. 271, 274." Zepeda v. Int'l Hodcarriers, etc., supra at 614, 300 P.2d at 253.
Mooney v. Bartenders Union, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957) extends the application of
this rule to all financial matters of the union. For materials on unions and unincorporated asso-
ciations, see Sultan, supra note 6, at 231, n.26. Compare Summers, The Right to Join a Union,
47 CALrF. L. REv. 33, 42 (1947). "To exclude a man from a club may be to deny him pleasant
dinner companionship, but to exclude a worker from a union may be to deny him the right
to eat."
37 Gonzales v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956). The right
to appeal was conditioned on a fine and on making an apology, neither of which were author-
ized by the constitution, and the apology, in addition, being an act difficult to revoke once it is
done. The court held that the petitioner had an immediate right to resort to the courts.
3 8 DeGonia v. Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, 155 Cal. App. 2d 573, 318 P.2d
486 (1957) ; Zepeda v. Int'l Hodcarriers, etc., 143 Cal. App. 2d 609, 300 P.2d 251 (1956).
39 Ibid.
40 Schou v. Sotogome Tribe, 140 Cal. 254, 73 Pac. 996 (1903) presents an example extreme
beyond comparison. All possible steps for securing an internal appeal were taken but no one
seemed to know whom to contact next, in whose jurisdiction the appeal lay, or what other steps
could be taken, as a practical matter, before the remedies were formally exhausted. In that case,
it was "the organization that failed" to provide access to its remedial system. This case was
followed in Weber v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 93 Cal. App. 2d 327, 208 P.2d 1009
(1949), relaxing the rule in cases of violation of the organization's own rules, but it was modified
in Holderby v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, supra note 32, to apply only to violation of
such rules as deal with the right to appeal. See Mooney v. Bartenders Union, 48 Cal. 2d 841,
313 P.2d 857 (1957); DeGonia v. Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, supra note 38;
Zepeda v. Int'l Hodcarriers, etc., supra note 38; Gonzales v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 142 Cal.
App. 2d 207, 298 P.2d 92 (1956).
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cases involving financial records4' or "property rights"42 the members may
petition the courts without exhausting internal remedies.
In the field of the relations of local and international unions, 43 the inter-
national union or federation cannot arbitrarily revoke a charter of a union
or put it into receivership.44 However, in cases of insubordination,45 finan-
cial strain46 or general failure to serve the membership in a proper manner,
47
the parent organization may charter new locals or suspend old ones. It is
41 Mooney v. Bartenders Union, supra note 40, dealt with the right to inspect union finan-
cial records. The court cited Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P.2d 6
(1951), for the proposition that "In the application of these principles we must weigh both the
protection of the rights of the individual members in the specific matter involved and the right
of the union to govern itself." The case held that since inspection of the books was a preliminary
matter, incapable of harming union activity, directed at an aim in which the unions themselves
are interested, and likely to cause irreparable harm if delayed, exhaustion of internal remedies
was unnecessary. Mr. Justice Carter concurred, arguing that Mooney v. Bartenders Union
overrules Holderby v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 45 Cal. 2d 843, 291 P.2d 463 (1955),
and accepts, in effect, his dissent in that case. It is submitted that this view is unduly optimistic
if Mooney remains confined to its facts.
42 The term "property rights" as used in some of the decisions is misleading and should
be construed in the sense of "rights to financial accounting" in the preceding note.
43 The relations between the local and its parent body, like those between the local and its
members, are controlled by the union's by-laws and constitution. DeMille v. Am. Fed. of Radio
Artists, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947); Most Worshipful Lodge v. Sons, etc., Lodge,
118 Cal. App. 2d 78, 257 P.2d 464 (1953) ; Killeen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employee Int'l Alli-
ance, 84 Cal. App. 2d 87, 190 P.2d 30 (1948) ; Brown v. Hook, 79 Cal. App. 2d 781, 180 P.2d
982 (1947) ; Stoica v. Int'l Alliance of T.S. Employees, 78 Cal. App. 2d 533, 178 P.2d 21 (1947).
44 Where the Grand Lodge improperly dissolved a subordinate lodge, it was not entitled
to the local's assent, Most Worshipful Lodge v. Sons, etc., Lodge, supra note 43, and cases cited,
the propriety of such dissolution depending on the constitution of the organization.
45 In Pizer v. Brown, 133 Cal. App. 2d 367, 283 P.2d 1055 (1955), the local refused to expel
totalitarian minded officers (specifically, members of the communist party and those advocating
its ideas) contrary to the directives of the International. Where the consequence of such refusal
was a decline in membership and the loss in the local's ability to represent its membership
effectively, the parent body was justified in chartering a new local. This on the theory that the
duty of the International is to the worker and not to its locals. Suspension for insubordination
in general is discussed in Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters, 143 Cal. App. 2d 474, 300 P.2d
157 (1956).
46 Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters, supra note 45. In this case the local (and note-
holders) sued for declaratory judgment as to the local's obligations to third parties and de-
manded enjoining the International from taking over. The International dissolved the local
because, due to a series of strikes, it got itself into financial difficulties and gave promissory
notes in excessive sums until the parent organization decided to intervene. After discussing the
several bases of privilege, the court held that the parent organization had the right to the net
assets of the local after payment of its debts. The situation is essentially analogous to a transfer
without consideration by a corporation of all its assets to a successor corporation without there
ever having been a statutory merger. In such a situation, an unsatisfied judgment creditor and
the transferor may trace the transferor's assets into the hands of the transferee and satisfy
unpaid debts to the extent of those assets. Thus, by dissolving the local and assuming control of
its assets, the International undertakes the responsibility of paying the just debts of the local to
the extent of those assets. In the present case, it should be noted, the debts totaled $50,000 and
the assets were $250.
47 See notes 43 to 46 supra.
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the duty of the parent organization to the workers, not to the local, that
underlies the propriety of such actions,48 contract theories notwithstanding.
The above cases illustrate the California courts' remarkable sensitivity
and foresight in framing a legal structure which may not act arbitrarily
in derogation of the rights and interests of its membership. And these
strictures emanate from court-created law rather than from statute or
contract. Cumulatively, the cases compose an approach that makes of the
union, as to its internal affairs, a new kind of public utility of labor rela-
tions. The consistent effort to restrict the unions in their internal dealings
in order to equate their action with that of a public utility was not
paralleled by as consistent an effort in the realm of external dealing with
the employers. There, the analogy to a public utility was forgotten. A
recent reversal of the court which fractures the union operative machinery49
is the apparent negation of the right of the union to organizational picket-
ing, hitherto protected under sections 920 to 923 of the Labor Code.
II
Like most recent labor legislation, and indeed the later Jurisdictional
Strike Act,50 sections 920 to 923 of the Labor Code5' represent an attempt
to reconcile the competing values of the three major parties to labor dis-
putes.2 The interest of the unions lies in organization on an industry-wide
level which protects minimum standards against the incursion and competi-
tive advantage of individual employers. Yet, industry-wide organization is
bound to curtail the local autonomy of the employees on the plant level.
The employees in a single plant, if they choose to disassociate themselves
from the rest of the employees in a larger unit, will insist on their inde-
pendent right to choose or reject unionism even though such rejection may
impair their own well-being" as well as that of other employees whose
economic protection depends on industry-wide pressure. The employers'
interests are diverse. Some would prefer to defeat unionism entirely. Others
would want to deal only with the majority representative. Still others
would, if possible, keep unionism to a minimum and deal with local, small
and ineffective unions rather than with powerful, industry-wide organiza-
48 See note 45 supra.
49 See Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
50 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1115-1120.
51 Enacted 1937. Based on Stats. 1933, ch. 566, § 2, p. 1478.
52 Sultan, Historical Antecedents to the Right to Work Controversy, 31 So. CAL. L. REv.
221, 243 (1958). "Proposals designed to increase the power of the individual in the labor market
are built on the illusory premise that an individual can exert substantial bargaining power as
an individual. We must be ever mindful that the alternative to collective bargaining is no bar-
gaining . . . power in the labor market cannot be destroyed; it can only be re-distributed".
Also Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d ... , 339 P.2d 801 (1959).
53 In the past days the "right" of the worker to work 17 hours a day was as seriously
defended.
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tions. Clearly, any unlimited endorsement of the interests of one group
must come at the expense of others. Just as clearly, a policy of compromise
which attempts to reconcile the conflicting views will encroach on the more
extreme demands of the remaining parties. Sections 920-923 of the Labor
Code attempt to establish such a policy of compromise.
Section 921 prohibits the enforcement of promises relating to mem-
bership in labor organizations between employees and "their employer,
prospective employer or any other person." The *term "or any other
person" creates a problem of construction. The rule of ejusdem generis
points towards construing it as "other such like"' and the word "agent"
used in section 923 seems to fit the specification.
Section 922 states that "any person, or agent or officer thereof" will be
guilty of a misdemeanor if he uses coercion to prevent another from joining
or remaining in a labor organization "as a condition of securing employ-
ment or continuing in the employment of any such person." This last
limitation seems to restrict the employers in their attempt to coerce their
employees in matters of membership in labor organizations. The section
was originally construed to apply to yellow dog contracts only, excluding
legitimate union endeavors to organize a non-union plant. In Shafer v. Reg.
Pharmacists Union55 sections 920 to 923 were held to "lay no statutory
restraint upon the workers' efforts to secure a closed shop contract from
the employer. .. ." The Court weighed the argument that pressuring the
employer to influence his recalcitrant employees to join a labor union would
place the employer in a position of exerting pressure prohibited under sec-
tion 921, but, "considering the history and purpose" of the sections, it
concluded that this variety of pressure was not covered by the act.
Section 923 states the policy applicable in construing the preceding sec-
tions, and reads in part:
Negotiation of terms and conditions of labor should result from volun-
tary agreement between employer and employees. Governmental authority
has permitted and encouraged employers to organize in the corporate and
other forms of capital control. In dealing with such employers, the indi-
vidual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms
and conditions of employment. Therefore, it is necessary that the individual
workman have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designa-
tion of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interfer-
ence, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives of in self-organization or in other con-
54 See Ring, Labor Union's Right to Picket Non-Union Business, 14 CAL. S.BJ. at 102
(1939).
55 16 Cal. 2d 379, 388, 106 P.2d 403, 408 (1940).
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certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
and protection.56
Significantly, the legislators used the word "therefore" in linking their
statement about "freedom of association and self-organization" and the
reasons advanced for the promulgation of the statute. Thus, freedom of
employees' self-organization was linked to the objective of equalizing
labor's position to that of the management's for the sake of better and
more effective collective bargaining. In the following section, dealing with
interference, restraint and coercion, the source of these evils was identified
and implicitly limited to "employers of labor or their agents." In this light,
the opening sentence about voluntary dealing between the employer and
the employees must have used the term "voluntary" in the meaning of
"unrestrained by the employer." Any other construction of this statute
would be inconsistent with the basic philosophy of section 923 and the
language of its preceding sections.
For, as suggested above, the crux of sections 920 to 923 is the philosophy
of the statute as embodied in all its provisions and as stated in section 923;
the realization that under conditions of modern industrialism the individual
working man is helpless in his dealings with the organized management.
The policy of the act is directed towards encouraging unionism as a means
of counter-balancing the economic power inhering in the employers and of
equalizing labor's opportunity to engage in meaningful collective bargain-
ing. In construing this section the courts recognized that the organization
of the employees at the single plant level may not be sufficient to accomplish
the goals of realistic bargaining. Economic pressures brought to bear on an
isolated plant can easily be neutralized where the plant is merely one unit
in a multi-unit industry. Management could easily find ways for circum-
ambulating the stricken area without seriously impairing its total produc-
tion. In situations involving several plants integrated under a common
management, striking in one leaves management strongly entrenched in the
others. To bargain with its employers the union must be able to apply
pressure corresponding roughly to that exerted by its opponents. In short,
the philosophy of section 923, unless it is to be construed out of any prac-
tical meaning, presupposes a right to an industry-wide organizational drive.
This conclusion holds true even where the union does not attempt to
organize an industrial giant but a multitude of independent entrepreneurs.
In the first place, many "small" one-unit enterprises may form or partici-
pate in employer associations, organized for collective bargaining, or engage
in active cooperation among themselves, so that the unit cannot be con-
sidered in isolation. Secondly, in small plants competing in one field of
economic endeavor a non-union employer will enjoy a competitive advan-
56 The word "therefore" is italicized by the author.
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tage over organized employers, threatening the union's retention of the
organized employers. Thirdly, even where union standards and scale are
adopted in a non-union plant, the union must contend with the specter of
organized employees benefiting automatically from the union's efforts
and retaining all the benefits of union membership without contributing
their share of the expense or burden carried by union members. Thus,
when organizing on a local, sporadic level, the union contends with both the
resentful employers, who find themselves in an unfavorable position vis-a-
vis the unorganized competitors, and the unhappy rank and file, who enjoy
paying dues to the unions about as much as they cherish paying income
taxes.
The foregoing considerations led the California courts to construe the
right to effective bargaining to contain and imply the right to an industry-
wide organization. The organizational drive could be launched from outside
a plant regardless of the number of employees subscribing to it at the time
and the objectives sought by the union could include organizational pres-
sure, a demand for exclusive bargaining status or a closed shop. In either
case, sections 920 to 923 made it clear that in peaceful and proper use of
pressure, either directly on the employees or, indirectly, on the employer,
hoping to induce him thereby to influence his employees to join the union,
the union could not be obstructed. Consequently, "The balance of values
(was) found to weigh in favor of judicial self-restraint in enjoining or
penalizing union activities reasonably calculated to achieve (union welfare
and objectives) ."
For eighteen years, the above understanding of sections 921 to 923 was
accepted by the courts of California. In McKay v. Retail Auto. S. L. Union",
the court held that it was legal for the union to picket in an organizational
drive even though the employees were satisfied with their working condi-
tions and refused to join with the union. Under similar conditions, the
court found the "closed shop" a lawful union objective in Shafer. In
Shafer, Wicks v. Southern Pacific Co.59 and DeMille v. Am. Fed. of Radio
Artists,6" the courts held that there is no constitutional right inhering in
the individual employee which guarantees him the right to work as a non-
57 Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 620, 320 P.2d 473, 489
(1958).
58 16 Cal. 2d 311, 326, 106 P.2d 373, 381, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1940). "The closed
union shop is an important means of maintaining the combined bargaining power of the work-
men. Moreover, advantages secured through collective action redound to the benefit of all em-
ployees, whether they are members of the union or not, and members may resent non-members
sharing in the benefits without liability for the obligations. Hence, a closed shop policy is of
vital importance in maintaining not only the bargaining power, but also the membership of
trade unions .... "
59 121 F. Supp. 454 (1954).
6031 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
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union employee. In Pezold v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen,"' as in McKay, the picketing union did not represent the em-
ployees which it sought to organize. And a long line of cases, on the facts or
in dicta, supported the right to engage in such picketing.2 As stated in
C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons :63
The members of a labor organization may have a substantial interest
in the employment relations of an employer although none of them is or
ever has been employed by him. The reason for this is that the employment
relation of every employer affects the working conditions and bargaining
power of employees throughout the industry in which he competes. Hence,
where union and non-union employees are engaged in a similar occupation
and their respective employers are engaged in trade competition one with
another, the efforts of the union to extend its membership to the employ-
ments in which it has no foothold is not an unreasonable aim. [Italics
added] 64
The importance of collective bargaining as expressed in section 923, out-
weighs the considerations of possible injury to the employer and to his
employees.
It is in line with this philosophy that in a series of six cases rendered
in 1940, three of which, McKay, Shafer and Smith, were cited above, the
court construed the right to organizational and recognitional drive in its
broadest form. Although in many subsequent cases the courts followed
these decisions without question, they eventually imposed certain adjust-
ments and limitations. In Park and Tilford Import Corp. v. Int'l Brother-
hood of Teamsters, etc.,65 the court restated the prevailing construction of
sections 920 to 923, asserting that organizational and recognitional picket-
ing were valid under the laws of the state, but placed limitations upon such
picketing in cases where it would force the employer to acquiesce in or
commit an action prohibited by federal law. At the time of this decision
section 8(3) of the NLRA66 forbade employer compliance with a closed
shop demand by a union representing only a minority of his employees.
Under the "lawful objective" doctrine, the California court accepted the
federal condemnation of that objective and enjoined the union from picket-
ing for a closed shop until it reached majority status in the plant.
6154 Cal. App. 2d 120, 128 P.2d 611 (1942).
62 See Benton, Inc. v. Painters Local Union, 45 Cal. 2d 677, 291 P.2d 13 (1955) ; Park &
Tilford Import Corp. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P.2d 891
(1946).
63 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106 P.2d 414 (1940).
64 Id. at 401, 106 P.2d at 421. See also Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 405, 409,
106 P.2d 411, 413 (1940). "One who sells a product of a merchant or manufacturer engaged
in a labor dispute with his employees, inescapably becomes an ally of the employer. He has a
direct unity of interest with (such employer). By providing an outlet for that product, he en-
ables the employer to maintain the working conditions against which labor is protesting."
65 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P.2d 891 (1946).
6649 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (3) (1952).
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Park and Tilford is a precedent for prohibiting union action for a
closed shop in advance of attaining majority representation in a given plant.
However, it prohibits only the immediate demand for such a clause and
permits continued picketing of the employer in order to pressure his em-
ployees to join the union with the objective of a closed shop as an express,
though ultimate, end of the picketing.
A union would be deprived of one of the most effective means of obtain-
ing a majority if it could not picket and boycott an employer's business with
the object of so discouraging public support of the business that non-union
workers would face the prospect of loss of their jobs .... 67
With this statement, Park and Tillord goes on the record as another author-
ity in support of the public policy statement of section 923.
In 1955 the Supreme Court of California rendered its decision in Benton
Inc. v. Painters Local Union68 which in substance reaffirmed the previous
rulings. In that case, decided on the same day as Garmon v. San Diego
Building Trades Council (in its first incarnation),"" the court denied injunc-
tive relief on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies
before the NLRB stating that "under California decisions an employer
may not obtain relief from economic pressure asserted in an effort to compel
him to sign a union shop agreement. °7 0 The court denied not only injunctive
relief but damages as well, even though in the twin case of Garmon it argued
that such picketing was tortious under California laws." Since the court
stated in Benton that "The state court has jurisdiction to award damages
to the employer if the evidence shows that it is entitled to them under state
law .... ,72 and since it had the precedents of both Park and Tilford and the
Garmon case to enable it to characterize the conduct as unlawful under
state law, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the Benton case is
that the court followed the established precedents holding that peaceful
picketing for a union shop contract was not unlawful per se in California.
67 This view seems logically implied in Plant, Recognitional Picketing by Minority Unions
in California, 9 SrAN. L. Rav. 100 (1956). The author discusses Shafer v. Reg. Pharmacists
Union, 16 Cal. 2d 379, 106 P.2d 403 (1940), McKay v. Retail Auto. S.L. Union, 16 Cal. 2d 311,
106 P.2d 373, cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566 (1940), and C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons,
16 Cal. 2d 389. 106 P.2d 414 (1940) suggesting that in organizational strikes it is possible to
save the legality of unions' demands from the employer by construing them as not intended to
be fulfilled until the union gains a majority. In discussing Garmon v. San Diego Building
Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958) and Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Int'l
Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P.2d 891 (1946), it is submitted that the
same approach could have been adopted.
68 45 Cal. 2d 677, 291 P.2d 13 (1955).
69 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955).
70 45 Cal. 2d at 681, 291 P.2d at 16.
7145 Cal. 2d at 666, 291 P.2d at 7.
7245 Cal. 2d at 681, 291 P.2d at 16.
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III
Into this impressive array of cases descended the recent Garmon73 case
with a truly "off with their heads" attitude.74 Justice Schenk, writing for a
majority of four, did not begin his argument with a discussion of public
interest in collective bargaining. Instead, he opened with the citation of
section 1708 of the Civil Code which imposes the general duty "to abstain
from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon any of
his rights." The exception to this duty, said the court, is "proper and law-
ful" conduct. However, in discussing what is lawful for a labor organiza-
tion "under the statutory and decisional law" of this state and in conclud-
ing that the union shop does not belong with the lawful objectives, the court
failed to cite a single case in its support! Its "decisional law" non-existent,
the sole remaining ground was the "statutory law," or more precisely, sec-
tion 923. This, however, was cited with the symptomatic omission of the
whole part dealing with collective bargaining as the rationale for the act
and the assertion that it is "therefore" that the right to self-organization
should be protected.75 Thereafter, sailing was easy. Under the emasculated
section 923, cited in part and without reference to the preceding sections,
the request of the outside union for closed shop was enjoined and damages
were assessed. The court also invoked in its aid section 1667 of the Civil
Code stating "[t]hat is not lawful which is ... contrary to the policy of
express law though not expressly prohibited .... ,,76
Surprisingly enough, nowhere in the decision did the court address it-
self directly to the actual meaning of section 923. In discussing the McKay
case it simply assumed that "the conduct of the defendants was directly
contrary to the policy of the state, as set forth in section 923" 1 even though
73 Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
74 It should be noted that almost all the labor cases in California are 4 to 3 decisions and,
consequently, a minority (having acquired one additional vote for its point of view) could
over-rule 18 years of precedents by simply reiterating its old and consistently defeated position.
In the Jurisdictional Strike Act cases Mr. Justice Schenk seems to be writing a minority opinion,
as he usually declines to cite, let alone accept, any case in which his views do not prevail. But
this opinion, suddenly becoming a majority decision, wrecks more than even its author presum-
ably intended.
75 Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, supra note 73 at 606, 320 P.2d at 480.
The court cites Loup v. Cal. Southern R.R. Co., 63 Cal. 97 (1883) in support of its statement
that infringement of absolute rights by acts not authorized by law is a tort. It then uses the
anti-discrimination cases, Park & Tilford and Marinship, to prove that only lawful actions are
exempt from this policy. The statements in C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons, supra note
67, and McKay v. Retail Auto. S.L. Union, supra note 67, Shafer v. Reg. Pharmacists Union,
supra note 67, and other cases that there is no absolute right in the employer not to be inter-
fered with in his employment policies is rejected by implication since the court cites the Juris-
dictional Strike Act in support of its position that such a right is now established in the Cali-
fornia law.
7 6 Id. at 607, 320 P.2d at 480.
77 Ibid. The court could have cited, for instance, the dissenting opinion of Justice Marks
in McKay v. Retail Auto. S.L. Union, supra note 67, but, instead, it chose to rely on no prece-
dents whatever.
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every specific instance of application of section 923 spelled the opposite
result. The majority stated that the McKay case was overruled on its facts
by the Jurisdictional Strike Act and proceeded with the statement that "it
would serve no useful purpose to review the numerous other decisions of
this court cited by the parties [since] those decisions have been superseded,
in many respects, by later law both statutory and decisional. To engage in
the task of distinguishing and discussing them now would be a work of
supererogation." 78 All this in spite of the fact that the Garmon decision
conflicts with the basic philosophy expressed in the Smith case, overrules
the traditional construction of section 923 as first established in the Shafer
case, brushes aside the inferences of Park and Tilford, and strikes out the
long line of cases resting on them.
The key to this novel approach--or, rather, to this reincarnation of long
defunct theories-can be found in the court's statement that section 923
(as emasculated) should be read in pari materia with the Jurisdictional
Strike Act.79 Until the present case section 923 was read in pari materia
with sections 920-922. As will be suggested in the following pages, the
Jurisdictional Strike Act was originally designed for the limited purpose of
protecting the employers from a bona fide jurisdictional strike. As initially
understood, the act would have created a new compromise between the
basically pro-labor policy of sections 920-923, under which no amount of
injury to the employer would justify court intervention in a lawfully con-
ducted labor activity, and the effort to help the unfortunate employer
caught up between two warring unions. The uncompromising stand taken
by the Legislature in sections 920 to 923 was to be modified by exempting
from its application a situation involving a jurisdictional dispute, which
was eminently deserving such consideration.
As construed by the court in Garmon the Jurisdictional Strike Act
went actually further than intended and became something of an antithesis
to the philosophy of section 923. By considering the broad policy of 923 in
pari materia with a narrow exemption of the Jurisdictional Strike Act, the
court accomplished something akin to completely overruling section 923
instead of merely amending it. Admitting that in the present case there was
no factual ground for invoking the Jurisdictional Strike Act, 0 the court
78 Id. at 614, 320 P.2d at 484.
79 Id. at 608, 320 P.2d at 481.
SOld. at 608, 320 P.2d at 481. "In the present case it does not appear clearly whether the
plaintiff's employees had or had not selected a committee or unit or other agency for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining. However, it does appear that they preferred to deal directly with
their employers pursuant to their individual bargaining rights. If they had exercised their rights
under the law and chosen to deal with their employers through some committee or organization
they would have come directly within the provisions of the Jurisdictional Strike Act." Com-
pare with Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d ....... 339 P.2d 801 (1959).
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cited the Act only because of its obvious policy implications-the protection
of the employers. Disregarding the history of section 923 and its inner
logic, the court asserts that it, like the Jurisdictional Strike Act, was
designed "to protect the rights of individual workman and employer in this
important field of labor management relationship." [italics supplied] 8 1
Yet, the right of the unions to organizational action is as conspicuously
absent from the court's analysis as this gravamen of section 923 was absent
from the court's quotation from that section. Furthermore, the Garmon
case goes the Jurisdictional Strike Act one better in stating that mere
preference of the employees to deal directly with the employer pursuant
to their "individual bargaining rights," even where it is not acted upon,
suffices to block the organizational activities of a union.
IV
At the latest Court Session Garmon was augmented with Chavez v. Sar-
gent, 2 a Right To Work Ordinance case. The pertinent sections of Chavez
are a short statement of law applicable to local Right To Work ordinances.
On top of that, however, Chavez incorporates a sixty page textbook of
dicta ranging over the whole field of California labor relations.8 3 Tech-
nically, the case was decided on the grounds of State preemption and con-
flict with legislative and decisional law, either one of which would appear
to be sufficient to uphold the judgment.84 However, in view of the inherent
ambiguity of the twice reversed Garmon and the fear of the debilitating
effect the latest reversal might have had on the authority of the local aspects
of Garmon,5 is is not surprising that Chavez became a virtual re-argument
of Garmon.6 In spite of its dictum character, the case is an authority at
least as to the present thinking of the Supreme Court and, accordingly, it
merits a brief examination.
First, Chavez undertook the task of "supererogation" refused in Gar-
mon87 and confirmed that the court's new reading of section 923 in pari
materia with the Jurisdictional Strike Act 8 supersedes all the decisional
law dealing with the subject matter. McKay, Shafer, Smith, and even Park
81 Id. at 608, 320 P.2d at 481.
82 52 Cal. 2d ........ , 339 P.2d 801 (1959).
S3 Id. at ........ ,339 P.2d at 818. For an extreme example, see Headnote 20.
84 Id. at ........ ,339 P.2d at 810.
85 Id. at ........ , 339 P.2d at 826, 832. "The reversal of Garmon in San Diego Unions v.
Garmon, 27 U.S.L. Week 4268 (April 20, 1959) of course does not affect state labor law inde-
pendent of federally preempted matters."
86 Id. at ........ , 339 P.2d at 829. ". . . proper interpretation of those sections ... is for the
first time reexamined in the case at bar."
87 See Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 614, 320 P.2d 473, 484
(1958) and Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d ......... 339 P.2d 801, 826-28 (1959).
88 Chavez v. Sargent, supra note 87 at ......... 339 P.2d at 823.
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and Tilfords9 were all supplanted 0 in so far as they hold that sections 920-
923 do not proscribe demands for a "union shop" in organizational drives
or that the policy enunciated in them protects the entire community of
workers rather than local employees in any given plant. The reasoning
and philosophy of the Shafer case, for instance, was dismissed as "a recita-
tion of, and comment on, one of the arguments which was presented to the
court but not as forming the controlling basis for its conclusions." (italics
supplied) 91
The court considered section 923 in a historical setting as reflecting the
process of labor's emergence "from weakness to power"" and seemingly
concluded that with the "increasingly powerful" union pressures and the
"growing public concern over the clashes arising from the proscribed
activities," 93 a re-evaluation of lawful labor objectives is in point. This,
however, is a question of factual analysis and general policy, both clearly
legislative tasks.9 To avoid flagrant judicial "legislation" the court con-
strued past legislative action and precedents imputing to them its own
ideas. In retrospect we learn, suddenly, that both section 923 and cases
appurtenant to it espouse the cause of an individual employee and not of
his union. "Organization and collective bargaining are but tool to that
end."95 The need to equalize labor's bargaining power to that of the em-
ployers is suddenly altered to read that "the issue is not between labor and
management (but) it is between the workmen and the unions .... 9 ' All
the court had to say of labor-management relations is that "[a] n effect to
be desired is to decrease activities in the wasteful arena of economic com-
bat... strikes, lockouts, work stoppages, mass picketing, or acts of physi-
cal or economic violence which if not specially protected, would constitute
torts or other violation of laws, state and federal.1 97
Admitting that collective bargaining is an important right of the em-
ployees, the present majority feels that the employee's right to "self deter-
mination" outweighs his right to economic security.98 From the practical
89 Id. at ........ 339 P.2d at 826, n.12.
9 Id. at ....... 339 P.2d at 814, 826.
91Id. at ......... 339 P.2d at 816.
92 Id. at .........339 P 2d at 811.
93 Id. at ....... 339 P.2d at 811. This is the policy underlying the Jurisdictional Strike Act.
For its proper construction, see p. 43, infra.
9 41Id. at ........ 339 P.2d at 816. Granting that on policy grounds if union strength is misused
or grows to intolerable proportions it may well come under appropriate legislative control, the
controlling question remains whether or not the time for such intervention arrived, and who,
in the final account, must intervene to accomplish the change?
9 5 Id. at ........ 339 P.2d at 824. ".... the state of California ... made the welfare of the
individual workmen, through the principle of freedom to associate, organize and bargain collec-
tively, the paramount principle of its legislation." Id. at ...... 339 P.2d at 811, 816.
98 Id. at ....... 339 P.2d at 824.
97 Id. at .... ,339 P.2d at 828.
98 id. at ....... 339 P.2d at 824.
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point of view, the court, trying to hold on to both "rights," goes far towards
denying them altogether. "By looking only to the workmen immediately
involved... the majority opinions blind themselves to the essential inter-
relation of working conditions in competitive business and choose as a
relevant group whose majority may govern, not all of the workmen with
interest in common, but only a small fraction of them." " Thus, a practical
right of a union is jeopardized in order to avail to individual workers an
ephemerally beautiful "right to self expression" for which no enforcement
machinery is available' and which, moreover, is circumscribed when and
if local elections take place.'
The right to "self determination" rests on the absolute prohibition of
employer interference with employees' organizational choice. Once this
approach is selected, the Garmon case logically proscribed all employer
interference with his employees' rights "in the designation of . . .repre-
sentatives or in self organization or in other concerted activities."'1 2
Chavez endorses the rationale of Garmon but, faced with the resulting
prohibition of all collective bargaining, it backtracks to a position that "an
established union may, but an outside union may not, demand a closed
union shop." 103
Neither an unauthorized union or pretending employe's (sic) agent
nor an employer acting alone or in concert with any unauthorized employe
(sic) representive may lawfully attack an established employer-employe
(sic) relationship and compel the unwilling employe (sic) to join the
particular unchosen union as a condition of retaining or obtaining employ-
ment.' 0
4
The gist of the above quotation seems to be that there is no difference
in compulsion directed at "retaining" or "obtaining" a job and that, in
either case, only an authorized union may demand it. It follows that an
"established union" may be able to demand a closed shop, but no organizing
unions may ever avail themselves of this objective.
99 Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d ........, 339 P.2d 839, 847 (1959).
Dissent by Traynor, J. extending also to Chavez v. Sargent, supra note 87.
100 Chavez v. Sargent, supra note 87 at ........, 339 P.2d at 823. "This problem" says the
court "could well have legislative attention." Meanwhile, the court adopts an incredible attitude
stating that ". . . it well may be that the means of enforcement towards legitimate ends can be
greatly strengthened if attacks by organizers cease, and if labor and employer tactics are care-
fully screened . . ." Id. at ......... 339 P.2d at 829.
101 If organizational pressure can be declared as "essentially a jurisdictional strike dispute"
solely on the grounds of individual employees' "self determination," why should not this right
extend also to rejection of an elected union? And obversely, if a minority forfeits its rights once
it is defeated in elections and becomes bound by the elected union in its collective bargaining,
why should the minority retain its rights to defeat negotiations in industry wide bargaining?
1.02 Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d ......... 339 P.2d 839, 844 (1959)
(dissent).
103 Ibid.
104 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d ......... 339 P 2d 801, 823 (1959).
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The difficulty with this view is that if section 923 proscribes employer
intervention at all, it must proscribe it under all conditions."0 5 Employer's
recognition of a union shop would assist the recognized union in controlling
the labor market and in recruiting recalcitrant members regardless of the
"outside" or "inside" status of the union.' It makes little difference to
the unwilling employee under what pressure he is compelled to join the
"unchosen union." 0 7 The right of the non-union employee to remain un-
organized would be violated in either case. Permitting employer interven-
tion at all must hinge, of necessity, on some authority, but neither the Act
nor the judicial precedents provide it.
In the past the problem was solved by confining the prohibition of
employer's intervention to the "yellow dog"' 0 situations. This was based
on the history of section 923 and amply proved as the reason for passing it.
The present effort seems to have no other authority than the majority's
solicitude for the unwilling employee, unsupported by either legislative or
decisional authority and questionable on both its policy and its practical
application.
The next difficulty is with the statement that any organizational drive
for a closed shop is "essentially a jurisdictional dispute pressure." 0 9 The
Jurisdictional Strike Act is brought into play, not by virtue of actual
encroachment by the organizing union on other union's domain, but, since
"section 923 makes no distinction between organized and unorganized
workmen," 0110 by the mere act of organizing which is objected to by some of
the employees engaged in the plant."' Presumably this is true even if the
local employees have no intention of bargaining with their employer. It is
105 Id. at ......... 339 P.2d at 827. "Section 923 makes no distinction between organized and
unorganized workmen. The freedom of the workmen from employer influence is the same in
both cases."
106 Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d ... , 339 P.2d 839, 844-46 (1959)
(dissent).
1 07 Id. at ......... 339 P.2d at 844.
1o8 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d ........ 339 P.2d 801, 828 (1959).
109 The dissent points out another contradiction in Chavez. Presumably the majority is
not eager to reverse its own decisions under the jurisdictional Strike Act. But the JSA employs
the test of preventing a new union from attacking the settled one while Chavez introduces a
new test turning on the majority. If the organizational strike is "essentially a jurisdictional
dispute," Id. at ........ 339 P.2d at 829, then the employer in a bona fide jurisdictional situation
may find himself protected only against the weaker antagonist!
11" Id. at ........ 339 P.2d at 827.
"'l Ibid. "Collective bargaining agreements would seem to be scarcely worth the time and
effort of negotiation if the first labor organization to thereafter come along with a view to
recruitment could impose concerted pressure against the employer to induce the latter to agree
that he will discharge his employees unless they pay dues to the union and accept it in the
place of their established organization as their sole bargaining agent." (Italics supplied.) It is
illuminating that in its examples the majority assumes an existing organization while in its
narrative no such organization is necessary.
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true if they are indifferent to the point where the possibility of organizing
never occurred to them. In respect to this point the majority weaves its way
around the requirement of section 1118 that the controversy must arise
"between two or more labor organizations" by declaring that workers who
decide not to organize are also an "organization.""' 2 It then approaches
the requirement in section 1117 that the organization must exist for the
purpose of "dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes,
wages, hours of employment or conditions of work""' and announces that
this requirement is satisfied where the employees wish not to do any of
the aforementioned acts.
The illegality of demanding a closed shop turns on the success already
achieved by the union." 4 What happens, however, where a minority of
local employees object to an organizational drive? Does the logic of
Chavez carry the court far beyond where it professes willingness to go?
Does the language of Chavez mean, as Justice Traynor's dissent in Retail
Clerks' Union v. Superior Court seems to suggest, that two employees
forming a "local union" may enjoin an organizational effort from out-
side?". Does it mean that two un-organized employees may accomplish
the same? Could these two employees be "newly employed," hired after
the initiation of the organizational drive? Is it possible that the case means
to permit the union shop when, and only when, the union, the employer
and all the local employees agree to it unanimously, but not otherwise?
In California there are no procedures for certification of a union, such
as are provided in the NLRA as amended. Moreover, there are no enforce-
ment procedures compelling the employer to bargain with the union that
112 Id. at ........ , 339 P.2d at 826. This is accomplished by designating the employees as
"employee representation committee" and yet, the fact findings in Chavez were that "Most
of the employees of plaintiff are not members of the defendant labor organization and the
employees of plaintiff have not at any time demanded from plaintiff a union shop or union
recognition, nor have such employees participated at any time in the negotiations for collective
bargaining agreements, nor have the employees of plaintiff designated the defendants or any
of them as their representatives for collective bargaining." Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior
Court, 52 Cal. 2d ......... 339 P.2d 839, 846 (1959) (dissent).
113 Informing the employer of unwillingness to accede to the union's demands is enough.
Chavez v. Sargent, supra note 108, at ......... 339 P.2d at 826. But what of the employer's burden
of proof as to the existence of a labor organization? See Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior Court,
supra note 112, at ......... 399 P.2d at 846 (dissent).
114 Retail Clerks' Union v. Superior Court, supra note 112, at ........ , 339 P.2d at 844
(dissent). If a union shop agreement is proscribed at all times on the grounds of unlawful
employer intervention, then the intervention remains unlawful when made on behalf of an
established union. Chavez repudiates Garmon in so far as Garmon permits the union shop for
established unions. "Majority rule" says Traynor, dissenting, "is the creation of majority
opinion." Id. at ......... 339 P.2d at 846.
1 5 Id. at ........ , 339 P.2d at 846. But Traynor, too, errs in not pressing his logic home.
"No concerted activity . . . is lawful unless the employees involved achieve substantial
unanimity." Surely, he meant "unanimous decision."
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proves it does represent a majority. Nor is there any statutory procedure
to prohibit an employer from discharging employees who have urged union
organization, and hiring more compliant workers in their place. But until
Garmon and Chavez, the union could react to the employer's action by
invoking the strike, picketing the plant, or boycotting the employer. With
the Damocles sword of Garmon hanging over them and its unclear language
lending itself to elaboration by Superior Court judges almost at will, what
way remains open to labor unions in California to proceed with organiza-
tional activity?
V
As suggested in the introduction to this paper, the Supreme Court has
seriously impaired the effective functioning of the union by the Garmon
decision and has left little doubt as to its attitude toward future cases by
its decision in Chavez. The union cannot demand recognition from an em-
ployer or obtain it by economic action. It cannot attempt unionization of
non-union plants which are competitive to those organized. In summary
the union cannot engage in collective bargaining if it cannot get recognition
from the employer. Its bargaining will be ineffective if it cannot win
industry-wide organization.
These court-wrought strictures upon the California union are only half
the picture of negation. The other half, etched on the canvass of the Juris-
dictional Strike Act, prohibits effective strike action by the unions.
The Jurisdictional Strike Act was enacted in 1947.16 It was designed
to prohibit union interference with employers in disputes "arising out of
controversies between two or more labor organizations as to which of
them has, or should have, an exclusive right to represent the employees, or
to have the members of such an organization perform work for the em-
ployer."117 On the face of it, the Act is limited to cases where controversy
between the unions precedes the activity which the employer seeks to
enjoin, where the parties to the controversy are bona fide labor organiza-
tions "not found to be financed in whole or in part, interfered with, domi-
nated or controlled by the employer," and where the dispute is either a
"representation" dispute, with each union claiming to represent the em-
ployees in the plant, or a "work assignment" dispute," 8 predicated on the
demand that a given union replace others in performing a certain type of
work."' As to the other types of union activity generically subsumed under
11 6 CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1115-1120. Section 1115 declares the Jurisdictional Strike as "being
against the public policy" of the state, and "unlawful." Section 1116 entitles any person suffer-
ig injury from a violation of the act to damages and injunctive relief.
117 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1118.
118 See Tobriner, Roadblock to Labor Peace in California, Frontier, Jan. 1955, p. 7.
119 See, e.g., Wallace v. Carpenters Local Union, 137 Cal. App. 2d 468, 290 P.2d 583 (1955).
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the title of "collective bargaining," section 1119 specifically excludes them
from the coverage of the Act.2 °
At first glance there could have been little quarrel with the objectives
of such an act. 2 ' It appeared to uphold the right of the unions to engage
in concerted union activity-strikes, picketing, boycotts-so long as these
activities are not a result of a jurisdictional dispute." It is true that in
outlawing disputes of the work assignment type, the employer was given
a chance to create "jurisdictional" difficulties by an artificial distribution
of jobs among the different unions, calculated to arouse local jealousies and
provide the management with easy methods of incapacitating all the unions
so involved. Despite this criticism the Act apparently granted the employer
a limited and defensible right to self-protection in cases where he was an
innocent by-stander caught between two warring unions.
Further analysis, however, exposes both the term "jurisdictional strike"
and the Act itself, as fatally vague. Suffice it to consider, merely as an
example, the term "arising out of controversies." The phrase "out of," if
limited to its express portent, excludes situations where jurisdictional pres-
sures do not arise from pre-existing, multi-union quarrels for power, but
culminates in them. On the other hand, if this semantic guide is discarded
in favor of some overriding policy of enjoining all jurisdictional strikes,
no matter how initiated, the courts undertake a grave responsibility to
determine how far this new policy should extend short of infringing on
the express protection of the right of collective bargaining."
In Voeltz v. Bakery, etc., Union,'4 an AFL Bakery Workers Union
120 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1119. "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to interfere with
collective bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein set forth, nor to prohibit any individual
voluntarily becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, or from personally
requesting any other individual to join a labor organization."
121 The California State Federation of Labor raised no noticeable protest against the bill,
which Governor Warren signed, although its secretary voiced considerable misgivings. See 6
STAN. L. REV. 188.
122 Seven Up v. Grocery Union, 40 Cal. 2d 368, 381, 254 P.2d 544, 553 (1953). "[An
independent union is not prevented from endeavoring to organize an employer's employees
when they belong to an employer controlled union or to no union."
123 Thus the minority's prognosis is to limit the application of the act to the intervenor
unions only on the theory that it is the second union's intervention which converts the pre-
viously legitimate labor-management "a deux" bargaining into a jurisdictional dispute. How-
ever, this solution is necessarily limited to the facts in Voeltz v. Bakery, etc., Union, 40 Cal. 2d
382, 388, 254 P.2d 553, 557. It would be inapplicable in the context of Seven Up v. Grocery
Union, supra note 122, and is specifically modified in In re Kelleher, 40 Cal. 2d 424, 254 P.2d
572, 577 (1953).
1240 Cal. 2d 382, 254 P.2d 553 (1953). But see Globe D. Lunch Co. v. Joint, etc.,
Cullinary Workers, 117 Cal. App. 2d 190, 255 P.2d 94 (1953) presenting a difficult situation
where the winning union stopped picketing and, subsequently, after a management reorganiza-
tion, 86 of the 93 employees joined the other union. The employer recognized the second union,
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claimed to represent the company's employees and demanded of the man-
agement a collective bargaining agreement embodying improved wages,
hours and conditions of work. When the management refused, the union
called a strike and established a peaceful picket line outside the plant.
Only ten out of the forty-nine employees in the plant joined in the walkout.
The employer refused to yield and hired replacements. Eleven months
later, with the strike still on, an "independent" union composed of non-
striking employees bowed into the picture. The new union contended that
it represented the majority of those then employed by the company. The
employer sought an injunction against the original strikers asserting that
he was caught between two threats. If he persisted in defying the original
union, it would continue to picket him. If he acceded to its demands, the
new union, representing the majority of the employees, would strike. The
injunction was duly granted.
In In re Kelleher'25 a steamship company conducted its own election
to determine which union had the support of the marine engineers. The
CIO union, with which the employer had a collective bargaining contract,
won a majority over its AFL rival. When the contract expired two months
later, the CIO majority union demanded a hiring hall clause in the new
contract and, upon the employer's refusal to accede to its demands, struck.
The employer filled the vacant jobs with new employees who were immedi-
ately organized by the rival AFL union which then represented the
majority of the employees (the replacements supplanting those workers
who went on strike). The employer entered into a contract with the AFL
union in which, parenthetically, a hiring hall provision was not included.
A suit to enjoin the CIO union from picketing followed and the injunction
was granted.
In both cases above, the striking union was engaged in a lawful activity.
In Voeltz the dispute between the original union and the employer at the
time of the strike could not possibly be characterized as "arising out of a
controversy between two or more unions" simply because there were not
two unions present at the time the strike began. The second union did not
appear on the scene until eleven months later. In the Kelleher case the
striking union won the election and the right to exclusive representation
of the employees in negotiations over a new contract. In both cases the
employer endeavored successfully to break an otherwise lawful strike by
granted it exclusive bargaining rights without there being any showing of undue influence
or domination by the employer. The first union was enjoined from further picketing and the
court found that continued picketing constituted conspiracy with every participant in it a
principal to the offense. Compare Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees Union, 171
Cal. App. 2d ............ P.2d ........ (1959).
125 40 Cal. 2d 424, 254 P.2d 572 (1953).
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recognizing a rival union." 6 In each case the rival union had no prior claim
to represent the employees. In each case that union included replacements,
many of whom owed their jobs to the fact that the originally employed
workers were on strike and, accordingly, had a vested interest in voting
for any organization but the one representing the original employees. In
each case the new union demanded of the employer substantially less than
the striking union.
The dissenting minority in both cases viewed the situation realistically.
They stated that the dispute between the employer and the original union
arose, after all, from a cause unrelated to the intervention of another union
later in the dispute.12 7 They submitted that section 1119 of the Labor Code,
dealing with the right to collective bargaining, would be rendered meaning-
less unless the nature of the dispute were recognized. Accordingly, they
concluded that no amount of subsequent interference by other unions
could change the fact that these were bona fide disputes between the
employer and his organized employees. In the words of the dissent in
Kelleher:
I do not believe that the statute was ever meant to protect an
employer who is engaged in a dispute with his employees and the union of
their choice over legitimate labor objectives, and who seeks a ban on
otherwise lawful picketing on the ground that he has signed a contract with
another union willing to fill the jobs of the striking workers, thereby him-
self creating the jurisdictional dispute from which he seeks relief .... 12s
The majority of the court, however, saw it differently. They construed
the Act to apply to any labor-management disputes which in time devel-
oped into jurisdictional situations. "To place defendant's construction on
126 "Under California law ... an employer ... if all or part of his workers go on strike...
is at liberty to secure replacements. Thereafter, if his employees, including the replacements,
form their own association which qualifies under section 1117, no reason appears why an in-
junction against picketing may not be obtained if the trial court finds the existence of a juris-
dictional strike as defined in section 1118." Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees
Union, supra note 124, n.13.
127 Voeltz v. Bakery, etc., Union, supra note 124, at 388, 254 P.2d at 557 (dissent). "But
can it be seriously contended that a continuous course of picketing in support of a strike,
existing for many months before the appearance of the second union, arose out of, resulted
from, or was proximately caused by a controversy between the two unions? ... I have diffi-
culty following the reasoning that the lawful acts of the Bakery Workers were transformed
into unlawful acts by the conduct of a hostile labor organization, with which it has no affiliation
or connection." In re Kelleher, supra note 125 at 430, 254 P.2d 575 (dissent).
128 In re Kelleher, supra note 125, at 433, 254 P.2d at 577 (dissent). Compare with the
majority opinion in Voeltz v. Bakery etc. Union, supra note 124, at 386, 254 P.2d at 556. "We
do not believe that the fact that a dispute existed between defendants and plaintiff before the
association was formed ...takes the case out of the act requiring that the interference with
the employer's business arise out of a controversy between unions, for after the association was
formed and plaintiff's employees became members thereof, it endeavored to have defendants
withdraw from the arena and to induce plaintiff to bargain with it exclusively, yet defendants
continued their activities, interfering with plaintiff's business ......
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the Act would make it practically never applicable" said the court. "[T]he
unions would have to act simultaneously in their demands or disputes with
the employer before there would be an interference with the employer's
business.... If one of them made the demand any time before the other,
then the interference would arise out of a dispute between the employer
and the union rather than between the unions. It would rest wholly within
the power of the unions to arrange the chronology of their demands, and
to escape the force of the act."'-9
The effect of this majority position is simply to allow the employer to
decide when a "proper case" for an injunction arises.1 3° A legitimate union
with a long history of labor negotiations behind it may enter upon a strike
for what are admittedly lawful objectives and find itself suddenly enjoined,
not because of anything it did or could avoid doing, but merely because
the employer, at his will, invoked the claims of a rival union thereby creat-
ing a "jurisdictional" dispute. Even if it could have been assumed that
the rival union recognized by the employer was a bona fide labor organiza-
tion, which frequently it is not, it still remained with the employer to be the
sole judge of which union, if either, he recognized, regardless of past history
of labor relations in the plant. This would mean that the union which is
more aggressive, more active and, therefore, least acceptable to the em-
ployers, could be eliminated. Instead of fostering collective bargaining, such
a construction frustrates it. In the hands of the employer who regards union
activity as a paralytic agent, the Jurisdictional Strike Act has become akin
to a "super Salk Vaccine," enabling him to inject dead labor anti-bodies into
the dispute in order to forestall any live bargaining in his plant.
This construction of the Act by the majority of the court is difficult to
accept for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the writer believes that
the Act does not initiate a new policy of protection for management "at all
costs," but a limited amendment to the existing legislation. It purports to
remedy a specific situation. The stressing of only such strikes which arise
"out of" inter-union controversies, and the plain reading of section 1119
reasserting the right of collective bargaining, permit of no other inference.
The conclusion reached by the court that the choice is between a construc-
tion which may permit the unions to render the act "never applicable" and
the construction favored by it, which will enable the employer to apply
the act in all cases of labor dispute, is based on an erroneous dichotomy.
It is true that the act itself is unclear concerning its implementation, but
the reference to cases arising "out of controversy" could be construed to
129 See Voeltz v. Bakery etc. Union, supra note 124, at 387, 254 P.2d at 556.
130 See Voeltz v. B~kery etc. Union, supra note 124, at 387, 254 P.2d at 556. Some years
ago this situation was summarized in an article (6 STPAw. L. REv. 188) to mean that a "proper
case" for the purposes of the Jurisdictional Strike Act exists whenever an employer has an
agreement with one union and seeks an injunction against another.
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mean that the background and the history of the preexisting relations is
to be taken into account before the employer could make his exceptional
case warranting a jurisdictional Strike injunction. If so construed, the
acceptance of the defendants' position would result in the formulation of
definite criteria for allowing injunctions. It would foster issuing injunctions
in cases where the past history of the dispute proves its jurisdictional
character, but it would deny them where the record shows evidence of a
legitimate labor-management dispute camouflaged by the employer to
enjoin effective labor pressures.
If the court wished seriously to consider the advisability of delineating
fixed criteria for enjoining a union in jurisdictional disputes, it could, for
instance, confine the Voeltz case to its facts. In both the Voeltz and the
Kelleher cases the second union represented a majority of the employees
working in the plant at the time of the injunction. The court could decree
that the lawful conduct of the original union would cease to be lawful and
protected under law when the union ceases to represent the majority of the
employees but knowingly continues to picket the plant. As harsh and
questionable as such a decision might seem to the unions, it would have
been at least consistent with the Garmon case's approach'' and the test
would have had the additional appeal of appearing to serve the interests of
the majority of the employees in the plant and protecting their right to
self organization, rather than backing the employer in all cases with nary
an exception. 132
But in both cases the court made no reference to the employees'
choice.' The sole ground for the decisions was the fact that the employer
chose to deal with an independent labor organization, thereby determining,
by his own choice, at what point the strike against him would become
unlawful."' Furthermore, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion in the
131 Compare with Seven Up v. Grocery Union, 40 Cal. 2d 368, 254 P.2d 544 (1953). A
labor association existed and had a contract with the employer at the time of the second
union's organizational action. The unanimous decision in the Seven Up case is later distin-
guished by the minority in its dissent in Voeltz v. Bakery, etc., Union, supra note 124.
132 But see supra on election procedures. Compare with the language cited above and
followed by note 81. This language is contradicted in Seven Up v. Grocery Union, supra note
131, at 376, 254 P.2d at 549, where the court states that "the main purpose of the Act" is to
"protect an employer against interference with his business and the public from disturbances
resulting from a dispute between unions .... "
133 In Seven Up v. Grocery Union, supra note 131, at 372, 254 P.2d at 547 the court came
close to implying that the employees' choice is of significance. In that case a national union
struck to compel the employer to recognize it as a bargaining agent, when the employer had a
contract with a local association "not financed, interfered with, dominated or controlled" by
him. The court inferred a controversy between two unions out of an allegation that a collec-
tive bargaining agreement existed with the association and that the union's efforts would
necessarily tend to replace the association. The problem of what constitutes employer
"domination" is largely unsolved.
134 See In re Kelleher, supra note 125, at 430, 254 P.2d at 575.
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Voeltz case and affirmed in a dictum in the Garmon case, "... . there is no
requirement that the union in fact represent any of the employees; all that
is required is that more than one union claim the right to represent them."'
8 5
In addition, the court did not demand that the employer's recognition of
the rival union be in good faith. 3 ' It abdicated its duty of balancing the
equities of the dispute and substituted the employer's choice for court
inquiry. Yet, if the court wished to impose safeguards on this incredible
delegation of powers to the employer, it could have easily stressed that its
decision in Kelleher was motivated, be it in part, by the employer's good
faith in recognizing a majority union.3 7 The court could, but refused to,
establish, as a basic criterion in the application of the act, the innocence
of the employer caught between two bona fide unions. The mere existence
of a second or challenging union secretly sired by the employer, midwifed
by the court after a weekend's gestation period and delivered to inherit the
rightful position of the legitimate union seems to be all that is required for
the purposes of the Jurisdictional Strike Act, its antidomination language
notwithstanding.3
135Voeltz v. Bakery, etc., Union, supra note 124, at 390, 254 P.2d at 558. Compare:
... if the Act were to be read as plaintiffs contend, it would be impossible for any labor
organization legitimately to conduct a strike unless each and every employee engaged in the
strike, and no strikebreaker belonging to another organization were hired by the employer.
Obviously, if the hiring of a single strikebreaker who desired an alleged second organization
were enough to enable the employer to enjoin the strike, there would not remain in the State
of California the right to strike." Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 3, Bowman
Beverages Inc. v. General Teamsters, Butte County Super. Ct., No. 32441 (1957).
136 Consider, for instance, the once hypothetical situation, suggested by the Secretary of
State Federation of Labor, cited in 6 SLR 187 n.28, where an employer discharges some
organized men and hires others with the tacit understanding that they will form an independent
union. The employer sponsors the new organization but carefully refrains from financing it,
interfering with it or dominating it. Such action by the employer could result in an injunction
against bona fide labor strikers. Compare infra note 146.
137 But see In re Kelleher, supra note 125, at 431, 254 P.2d at 576 (dissent).
138 "Ex Parte" refers to the practice of granting temporary restraining orders upon request
of the plaintiff's attorney without as much as a notice to the defendant. The time the defend-
ant presents its side of the picture, the effect of such an order might have disposed of its
chances to win the strike. See note 142 infra. For a weekend gestation period see Bowman
Beverages, Inc. v. General Teamsters, supra note 135. Compare the following observations of
Professor Aaron (The California Jurisdictional Strike Act, 27 So. CAL. L. Rav. 237, 259-60,
(1954)). "During the past year, there have been at least' five instances in which requests
for injunctions were denied on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient
evidence of the existence of a bona fide jurisdictional dispute. The situations in these cases
generally conform to a common pattern: union organizational activities among employees of
small concerns, accompanied by demands for recognition; rejection of the union demands by
the employer; commencement of peaceful picketing by the outside union; sudden organization
of an allegedly independent employees' association; prompt recognition of that organization
by the employer; and the application for an injunction against the outside union under the
jurisdictional Strike Act." Note his conclusion, at 262, arguing for care and deliberation in
granting preliminary injunctions.
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The results of such policy were not long in coming. In Paradise Cor-
poration v. Theatrical Employees,"8 9 the plaintiff discharged all his union-
ized employees and in their place hired non-union workers. The union
struck. The Superior Court found that there was no jurisdictional dispute,
that no second union was in evidence, that there could have been no possible
reason for injunction under the Act. However, these findings were made on
the hearings for preliminary injunction, a temporary restraining order
having been granted! In other words, even as clear-cut a situation as that
present in the case above was not immune from the temporary restraining
order. In Hidden Harbor, Inc. v. Waiters Local 500, AFL,' where 15 out
of 18 employees went out on a strike organized by their union, the employer
hired replacements and, while instructing them in their duties, requested
that they appoint a chairman "to negotiate with management." The new
"Cunion" was "organized," a strikebreaker was elected as its representative
and the employees signed their contracts; all within one hour's time and
without any bargaining about labor conditions. A temporary injunction
issued and was dismissed later on, the court stating that the employer's
interference with his employees was self evident. It is not recorded what
happened to the strike after the temporary injunction was issued.
In a more recent case, Bowman's Beverages, Inc. v. General Teamsters
and Warehousemen,14' a union representing all the employees in the plant
went on strike for increased wages and better working conditions. The
evidence is uncontroverted that the strike was pursuant to legitimate bar-
gaining, that the union had represented the employees for many years and
that no dissatisfaction with it had previously been recorded. Within three
days after the strike was ordered an "independent" union propitiously
made its entrance upon the scene. It was hastily recognized by the employer
even before it had a chance to prove actual membership, much less take
genuine action. The employer signed an exclusive contract with it and sued
for an injunction and damages against the original union which was just
starting its strike. The court granted the injunction on the affidavits with no
evidence before it relative to the existence of a genuine jurisdictional
dispute except for the bare existence of a contract with a second union.
The cases just cited are the reductio ad absurdum of the Voeltz and
Kelleher doctrine. Whereas in the Voeltz case eleven months elapsed before
the recognition of the second union, raising the possibility of an honest
change in opinions among the employees in the plant, in the Bowman case
three days were found sufficient. Where in the Voeltz and Kelleher cases
a second union appeared in the end to assure the employer of his success,
139 36 LRRM (C.P.I.) 2266 (1955).
14035 LRRM (C.D.I.) 2327 (1954).
141 Butte County Superior Court, No. 32441 (1957).
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in the Paradise Corporation case the strike was broken without any second
union in evidence. Where in the Kelleher case the employer could plead
his good faith in recognizing the majority union, in the Hidden Harbor
case he had actively interfered with his employees' decisions, and yet a
temporary injunction was granted. Where in Voeltz and Kelleher a
majority of employees seemed to back the new union, the Bowman case
permitted an injunction against a union clearly representing a majority of
the employees. In most of these cases the temporary injunction is granted
on the affidavits and before actual determination of the facts in the case 142
even though the employer must meet the obligation of the burden of proof"
as well as the requirement of establishing that the denial of the injunction
would injure him more than its issuance would hurt the union. 44
It is true, of course, that the difficulty stems from the omissions in the
act itself and not merely from faulty judicial construction. For instance, the
act excludes employer dominated unions from its coverage yet it fails to
establish any method for defining what exactly belongs in that category.
Obviously, more extreme cases of employer domination need no analysis,
but . . . there may be interference of more subtle character which achieves
its objects less obviously."'145 After reading the decisions in the Hidden
Harbor or the Bowman cases, it seems almost impossible to make a stronger
case of circumstantial evidence of employer domination, and yet the courts
seem to take no notice. Appellate court decisions fail to clarify the issue
since, naturally, only such instances reach the appellate courts as fail to
establish domination.'46 With the superior court all but free of the tradi-
142 "Theoretically, such temporary restraining orders are granted only to prevent irrepara-
ble injury; (C.C.C.P. 526(2)) but the frequency with which they are issued in L.A. county
indicates that 'irreparable injury' is given so broad a definition as to render the distinction
between it and less serious damage virtually meaningless." Aaron & Levin, Labor Injunction in
Action, 39 CALI=. L. Rav. 42, 49. It must be remembered that in organizational strikes, "injunc-
tions are usually the decisive factor in the employer's favor, at least for the short run." Id. at 66.
143 "It is well settled that a preliminary injunction will not issue in a doubtful case. The
rule has been frequently laid down broadly that a preliminary injunction will not issue where
the right which the complainant seeks to have protected is in doubt, when the right to the
relief asked is doubtful, or except in a clear case of right. (36 CJ. 36) This rule is well recog-
nized in this state." Hueneme, etc., Ry. v. Fletcher, 65 Cal. App. 698, 703, 224 Pac. 774, 776
(1924). See also Aaron, The California Jurisdictional Strike Act, 27 So. CAL. L. REv. 237, 260
(1954).
144 The holding in Isthmian S.S. Co. v. Nat'l Marine, etc., Ass'n, 40 Cal. 2d 433, 254 P.2d
578 (1953) illustrates the point. In spite of the rather obvious facts, the court held that "the
case is not necessarily close on its facts when we review the evidence most favorable to plain-
tiffs, as we must do since the trial court made the order in plaintiff's favor."
145 Hidden Harbor, Inc. v. Waiters Local 500, AFL, 35 LRRM (C.D.I.) 2327, 2329 (1954).
See also Aaron & Levine, Labor Injunctions in Action, 39 CA=F. L. Rzv. 42.
146 Culinary Alliance & Hotel Service Emp. Local Union v. Beasley, 135 Cal. App. 2d 186,
286 P.2d 894 (1955) presents an extreme case in point, since the court held there that, where
the by-laws of the union prohibited striking or picketing (!) such clause was not conclusive
to show employer domination! The case contains assorted lists of facts which, seriatim et
separatim were held not constitute proof of domination.
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tional weariness in granting injunctions and mistaking the Jurisdictional
Strike Act for a blanket "protection for the employer," more and more
union actions are being enjoined whether or not they should have been
enjoinable on the facts under any logical reading of the law. For all practical
purposes there are no strikes today that cannot be easily broken by manage-
ment acting under the Jurisdictional Strike Act as construed by the courts.
Part of the blame must go to the Supreme Court for its failure to
establish reasonable criteria for application of the Act, yet there are prob-
lems of enforcement of the Act which properly belong with the legislature
because of their policy making import. Take for example the problem
(mentioned before without due examination) of assuring proper election
in inter union disputes. In the Voeltz and Kelleher cases the number of the
employees voting in the elections exceeded the total of employees in the
plant since the employees voting for the striking union and for the second
union were not the same employees. Usually, the original union had the
endorsement of the employees in the plant, at least part of whom were out
on a strike, and the second union had the endorsement of the replacements
hired to supplant the striking employees. Theoretically, it is possible that
twice the number of the employees which the plant could employ would be
entitled to vote in such elections. Nowhere is the frame of reference for
elections determined and no one knows who, exactly, should be permitted
to vote. In practice this means that the employer can regulate the number
of employees qualified to vote by deliberate hiring and firing or by hiring
replacements for employees on strike and, thereafter, defeating the rightful
union in elections in which more employees could participate than are
actually employable in the plant.'47
In the light of this basic problem it is easy to overlook other deficiencies
in the voting procedure. For instance the Act does not provide that a vote, if
taken, will be secret. 48 The union is faced with the choice of submitting
to its rival without an election (since a mere claim to represent the em-
ployees is enough) or insisting on an election. In the latter situation there
is nothing to stop the employer from firing the employees voting against
'47 Marion Plant states in his Recognitional Picketing by Minority Unions in California,
9 STAN. L. REv. at 116, n.71, that union claims of majority ".... can be easily substantiated if
valid by the introduction in evidence of 'authorized cards' signed by a majority of the employees
and designating the union as their bargaining representative." A case cited in support is . . .
a federal case ! Plant overlooks the problems involved in California procedures that it is unclear
who may vote, that, even if this problem was decided, California has no provision against
unfair employer practices and, with no protection for the voting union members, court elec-
tions may do no more than inform the employer what employees are to be fired next. Accord-
ingly, the author takes exception to Plant's statement that "The question whether the picketing
union represents a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit is no more difficult to
answer than most of the questions with which the State's trial courts are confronted, and much
less difficult than many." Id. at 166.
148 The facts in the published report never disclose the procedure taken in voting.
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it,"A9 except in the rare cases where the election is under the auspices of
the court (enabling it to use contempt power to enforce its decision).
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Jurisdictional Strike Act, as
construed, is an almost infallible strike-breaking device available to the
employer in all circumstances regardless of the actual existence of a juris-
dictional strike. There seem to be no limitations on the use of the Act for
strike-breaking purposes and even where the situation lies clearly outside
of the Act's purview, the tendency of the Superior Courts is to issue blanket
temporary injunctions which, in many cases, dispose of the strike as effec-
tively as if a permanent injunction were to follow them up.
The fatal deficiencies of the Act are many. In the first place, as con-
strued by the courts, its scope seems unlimited, extending to any organized
labor activity whatever with the employer in the position of a final arbiter
and converting legitimate strikes into unlawful action. Secondly, no criteria
for extending its application are established. It may apply to stop a ma-
jority as well as a minority union regardless of the past history of the
dispute, regardless of the motivations of the intruding group and the
employer's part in recognizing it prematurely or otherwise using it to
destroy legitimate unionism, regardless of its actual bona fides or member-
ship. It provides no election procedures, no protection against deliberate
firing and unfair employer practices. Finally, whatever the decision con-
trolling the permanent injunction, it presents the employer with a carte
blanche in temporary injunctions. Add to it that in addition to the injunc-
tion the employer may sue for damages' 50 and the picture becomes com-
plete. In breaking, actual strikes and in frightening unions from engaging
in contemplated pressure for wage adjustment, shorter hours, hiring hall
or other labor objectives, the Jurisdictional Strike Act surpasses by far the
Taft-Hartley restrictions without affording the unions its protection of
enjoining unfair management practices and supervising the election pro-
cedures for the benefit of the majority union.
In the world of the three to four decisions it would take only one
replacement on the Supreme Court to repeat the pattern of abrupt reversal
with the minority again delivering the binding construction of California
labor law.151 In the world of legislative politics the first unsuccessful attempt
has been made to express legislative intentions and correct the abuses per-
mitted under the present state of law. The time has arrived when Califor-
nia's labor law must face the disparity between its statutory policy and its
judicial reversal.
149 See Sommer v. Metal Trades Council, 40 Cal. 2d 392, 254 P.2d 559 (1953) where
the employer refused to recognize any union, either local or national.
150 See Seven Up v. Grocery Union, supra note 131, at 372, 254 P.2d at 547 where the
employer asked $100,000 in damages on the fourth count alone.
151 In this connection, the recent replacement of the late Justice Schenk by Justice Thomas
P. White should be noted.
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